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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
PAUL BRAMEL and
WILLIAM B. BROOKS,
Plaintiffs and Respondents,
vs.

Case No.
11479

THE STATE OF UTAH,
Defendant and Appellant.

BRIEF OF RESP0 NDENTS
1

NATURE OF CASE
Tlii:s is an action to recover damages for personal
injnry sustaint>d by plaintiff, vVillam B. Brooks, and property damage sustained by plaintiff, Paul Bramel, resulting from a one vehicle tractor-trailer accident that occurred on the off ramp at tlw temporary end of Interstate
Highway 15 north of what is known as 31st Street Exit at
or near Ogden, Utah.
DISPOSITION IN LOvVER ,COURT
The lower court found that the signs vlaced by the
State of Utah failed to give notice of the dangerous condition that existed at the temporary end of the freeway and
1

found plaintiff 'Villiam B. Brooks free from any negligence and awarded plaintiffs judgment in their favor and
against the State of Utah for personal injury and pro1Jerty damage in the sum of $27,878.25.
RELIEF t;OUGHT ON APPEAL
RPspondents seek to have the action of the lo-wer
court affirmed in entering judgment in favor of plaintiff 8
and against defendant.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The State of Utah constructed a portion of a freeway
in 'VPber County, Utah identified as Interstate Highway'
15, hereinafter ref erred to as I-15. This freeway is being
constructed and completed in sections, and at the time
in question the completed section of the freeway commenced near Kaysville, Davis County, and extended to the
temporary ending thereof at or near Ogden, \Veber
County.
On the completed section of I-15 referred to, the freeway is a divided north-south highway with thrPe traffic
lanes on the northbound portion separated by intermittent
white lines. The 31st street Exit is a one lane exit off tlw
freeway which goes in a northeasterly direction from the
highway at approximately 20 degrees. The off ramp at thP
temporary end of the free·way north of the 31st Street
Pxit is a one lane ramp which describes a tight arc of 270
degrees, and which funnels traffic from three traffic lanes
and a speed of 70 miles per hour (T13, R59) to one lane
and a reduction of speed to 25 miles per hour (T20, R66)
and forces it to change from a northerly direction through
2

three-quarters of a turn to a westerly direction. (See
Exhibit D-15)
On the day of the accident, November 29, 19G6, \:Villimn Brooks was employed by Paul Bramel, and at that
time, he was driving a 1966 Kenworth Diesel Tractor
"with a 19G3 '11 railer loaded with a cargo of cucmnbers
"Which weighed approximately 40,000 pounds (TS-9, R5455). The onrall length of the rig was about 55 feet (T9,
R55) "With the trailer being 38 feet long and 13% feet
high (TlO, R5G). l\Ir. Brooks, who lives in Houston,
Texas, was taking the cargo from Houston (Tll, R57) to
Seattle, "Washington ('11 9, R55), and while driving had
made it a }>ractice to drive for 10 hours and rest for 8
homs. He left Houston Saturday morning and the accident occnrred at approximately 8 :00 o'clock P.M. Tuesday
evening ('J111-12, R. 57-58). At the time of the accident it
was dark, with patches of fog along the highway (T12,
TI58) and tlw roadway 1rns slightl~' wet (TG7, R113). As
i1ir. Brooks neared where the accident occurred, "it wasn't
real foggy, hut it 1rns hazy," and he was traveling between
30 miles per hom and 35 miles per hour with his headlights on ( Tl3, R59). HP 1rns not tired or drowsy at the
time. ~lr. Brooks was llOt acquainted with the roadway
or the natnre of the off ramp at the temporar~, end of the
freP1rny. He saw Chenon signs somP distance from the
temporary end of the freeway which indicated the ending
of a lane or lanes (T19-20, (R65-66). Although l\Ir.
Brooks reduced his s1wed, he 1rns unable to negotiate the
tiglit clll"VP at the fn'P\\'a~, en<l off ramp and tllt' rig he
1vas driving tipped over doing extensi1'e damage to it and
n·:;~1lting in personal injury to him.
3

Mr. Brooks has been a driver of large tractor-trailer
rigs involved in interstate traveling for about 25 years.
He drives approximately 50,000 miles per year and has
never had an accident before (TS, R54).
The accident was invesigated by Utah High\Hl)'
Patrolman Jack Graviet who stated that he had been dispatched to this same location to inn~stigate accidents on
prior occasions (T87, R133). In making his investigation
of the accident, the officer traversed the scene and a
portion of the highway and stated that to the best of his
recollection the following signs were in place:
All Traffic Must Exit sign-one mile from scene
Two 25 Mile Speed Limit signs-% mile from
scene
Barricades with arrows and 25 miles per hour sign
-near end of freeway
Red and white Chevron signs--at end of freeway
(T72, Rll8, Tl92-193, R238-239) but there were no flashing light at the end of the freeway ( Tl95, R241).
John Lynn Owens, sign foreman for the State Highway Department, testified that the following signs were
in place at the time of the accident (TlOO, R14G):
End Interstate One Mile-One mile from scene
All Traffic Must Exit-By railroad crossing
Single Lane Ahead
Two 25 mph Exit signs-700 feet from ramp
Exit 25 miles per hour-50 feet from ramp
Chevron signs-Before ramp
Arrows-At exit
Barricades-At end of freeway
4

He stated that the State Engineer had furnished him with
a diagram from which to install the signs (T121, R167),
the installation of the signs began on N overnber 14, 1968,
and \Vas completed November 21, 1968 (TlOO, R146), that
tlw installation of the signs was a rush job for the dedication and opening of the roadway (T113, R159).
Dean Prisbre>y, a traffic engineer for the Utah Department of Highways stated in his testimony that the
placing of the signs along the freeway warning of the
condition that existed "·as a crash program in order to
gt•t the fret>way open (Tl 77, R223). Exhibit P-8 is the
Ptah Dt>partment of Highway Construction Signing plan
showing the types, number, kinds and locations of signs
that should be in place nnder the circumstances of this
case, and t>\·en though the State has adopted this plan,
all of the signs required thereby were not in place. The
94 foot detour barricade sign with flashing amber lights
showing that tlw road is closed and that a detour is
necessary (Exhibit P-8) was not in place (T159, R205)
and the Exit sign with an arrow shown on Exhibit D-7
was not in place but was substituted by a black and yello\\' sign sho"·ing on!~· an arrow ('rl77-l78, R223-224).
Although Exhibit P-8 requires that:
"Construction approach warning signs, three
48" x 48" warning signs, shall be located 500,
1,000, 1,500 feet, respectively, in advance of the
iwint of any flagnmn, construction activity, detour barricade or other major traffic restriction."
X o snch warning signs were in place when the accident
occurred (T178, R224).
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Kenneth W. Anderson, Deputy State Traffic Engineer, admitted that the design given to John Lynn
Owens, the State's sign forman, was "really quite crude,:
and that the original design for the installation of the
signs is not available (T141-143, Rl87-189).
Clyde Beutler was travelling approximately onPquarter of a mile behind Mr. Brooks when the accident
occurred and witnessed it. (Deposition Beutler, Page 4-)
He saw the erratic movements of the lights on the truck
and slowed down (Pages 6-7). Mr. Beutler stated that
he came to the curve at the off ramp, he saw one small
sign which said ''Exit Speed 25'' but saw no other indication that the freeway ended (Page 7). He stated
that the curve to the off ramp was abrupt, that he had
difficulty negotiating it (Page 12) and while he was at
the scene of the accident, several cars that came along
the freeway had difficulty negotiating the sharp curve
that forms the off ramp at the end of the freeway (Pages
17-18).
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE JUDGMENT AND PROCEEDINGS IN THE LOWER
COURT ARE PRESUMED TO BE CORRECT BY THE REVIEWING COURT ON APPEAL.

There are many cases supporting the general proposition of law stated in Point I, and especially as it applies to the instant case. No cases have been found by respondents stating a contrary position.
6

Not only is there a presumption of validity on appeal
of the judgment and proceeding in the lower court, but
the bnrden is on the appellant affirmatively to demonstrate error and in the absence of such the judgment
must be affirmed by the revie\ving court. Leithead vs.
Adair, 10 U. 2d 282, 351 P. 2d 956; Coombs vs. Perry,
2 U. 2d 381, 275 P. 2d. Again, on appeal the judgment
o the trial court is presumptively correct and every
reasonable intendment must be indulged in by the appellate court in favor of it. Burton vs. Zions Co-operative
lliercuntilc Institidiou, 122 U. 360, 249 P. 2d 514; Nagle
vs. ClulJ Fo11tainlJlue, 17 U. 2d 125, 405 P. 2d 346; Petty
vs. Gindy Jliam1facturing Corporation, 17 U. 2d 32, 404
P. 2d 30.
This proposition of law is correct and is binding
u1)0n the appellate court whether the proceedings in the
lower conrt are before a judge only or a judge and jury.
Otht>r cases supporting this proposition are Charlton
'VS. Hackett, 11 U. 2d 389, 860 P. 2d 176; Universal lnt'cstme11t Company 'CS. Carpets, Inc. 16 U. 2d 336, JOO P.
2d 564; Taylor vs. Johnson 15 U. 2d 342, 398 P. 2d 382;
vV ClldellJOC vs. Jacouso11, 10 u. 2d 344, 353 P. 2d 178;
Hadley vs. Wood, 9 U. 2d 366, 345 P. 2d 197; Daisy
Distrilmtors, Inc., 1jS. Local Union 876, Joint Council 67,
Western Confercnc<' of Teamsters, 8 U. 2d 124, 329 P.
2d 414.
Unquestionably an appellate court has the power to
Pxamine the findings of fact of the court below to determine whether they are supported by competent evi-
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dence, but a finding of fact made by a court acting without a jury will be sustained on appeal unless it is shown
by the appellant that such finding is clearly against the
weight or preponderance of the evidence, Jackson vs.
Jackson, 201 Okla. 292, 205 P 2d 297, 7 ALR 2d 1410;
Edmundson's Estate, 295 Pa. 429, 103 A. 277, 2 ALR
1150; Jhiggah vs. Smith, 33 ·wash. 2d 429, 206 P 2d 332,
9 ALR 2d 846; Higbee vs. Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co., 235
Wis. 91, 292 NW 320 128 ALR 734, or is not supported
by any substantial evidence, Van Voast vs. Blaine
County, 118 Mont. 395, 167 P2d 572, 169 ALR 681; Wilson Oil Company vs. Hardy, 49 N.M. 337, 164 P 2d 209,
1G2 ALR 292; or is clearly erroneous, Lassit!'r vs. Guy
F. Atkinson Co. (CA9 Wash.) 176 F. 2d 984, 21 ALR 2d
1313 (referring to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
Rule 52(a)); Pat.sy & Fiehrman, Inc. vs. Housing Authority, 76 R.I. 86, 68 A 2d 126, 44 ALR 2d 1106. Where the
evidence is evenly balanced, a finding of the trial court
either way must be sustained as not against the great
weight and clear preponderance of the evidence, K al.sop's
Will, 229 Wis. 356, 281 NW 646, 282 NW 587, 119 ALR
1094.

It is a general rule of law that the appellate court
does not ordinarily review the trial court's findings of
fact whether the findings of fact are based on direct
proof or upon inferences drawn from the evidence, Idaho
State Bank vs. Hooper Sugar Co., 74 Utah 24, 276 P. 659,
68 ALR 969.
Therefore, if appellant, the State of Utah, can prevail on the instant appeal it must be basPd upon the
8

ground that the findings of fact complained of by appellant are clearly against the weight and preponderance
of tlw evidence, or that they are not supported by any
snbstantial evidence, or that the findings of fact are
clearly erroneous. Respondents submit that appellant is
unable to do this and that the Findings of Fact, Conclnsions of Law and the Judgment of the lower court
must stand undisturbed.
POINT II
THE FINDING OF THE LOWER COURT THAT "AT
MOST" ONLY CERTAIN LISTED SIGNS HAD BEEN IN
PLACE AT THE TIME OF THE ACCIDENT IS NOT ERRONEOUS AND CONTRARY TO THE EVIDENCE.

Point II of Respondents' Brief will deal with the
same subject matter and will be written in answer to
Point I of Appellant's Brief.
In relation to the signs and markers at and near the
temporar~- end of the freeway ':vhere this accident occurred, the Court made, inter alia the following Findings
of Fact (R 31):
5. That reflectors, markers and signs had
been placed in various locations on the said freeway for the purpose of notifying and advising
motorists of e·xisting roadway and conditions, that
at most the signs included "Freeway Ends One
Mile," at a point about one mile south of the off
racp, "All Traffic Must Exit" about one-half mile
south of the off ramp, two black on yellow 25
miles per hour speed signs about one-fourth mile
from the e·xit, several red and white chevron
channelizing signs, a horizontal black on white
9

unlighted barricade at or immediately north of
the exit, a 25 miles per hour black on yellow exit
sign at or immediately south of the exit and a
black on yellow arrow at the north edge of the
exit.
rrhe witnesses at the trial who testified about the
number and kinds of signs that were in place along tlw
freeway when the accident occurred ·were William Brooks,
plaintiff; Dean Prisbrey, Traffic Engineer, District I,
Utah State Department of Highways; John Lynn 0-wens,
Sign Foreman, District I, Utah State Department of
Highways; Kenneth W. Anderson, Deputy State Traffic
Engineer, State of Utah; Jack Graviet, Utah Highway
atrolman; and Clyde Beutler, a motorist and witness to
the accident who was approximately one-quarter of a
mile behind Mr. Brooks when the accident occurred.
John Lynn Owens testified that certain signs were
placed along the freevrny by him between November 14,
1966, and November 21, 1966 (TlOO, R146). However,
he did not know what signs were in place when the accident occurred and he had no accurate memory of what
signs he originally put up (T113, R159) and that there
were some signs put up and existing signs changed after
the accident (Tl07, R153).
Dean Prisbrey testified that he had seen the signs
along the freeway on November 23, 1966, and the signs
he recalls being there were the following: ( 1) Ogden 31st
Street Exit, (2) Route Marker (3) All Traffic Must Exit,
(4) Advisory Speed Sign, (5) Arrow sign, and (6) 25
miles per hour sign (Tl56, R202). The 94 foot detour
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harricade with amber flashing lights as called for by the
Department of Highways' plans was not in place (T159,
R205).
Kenneth Anderson stated that he drove over the
section of the highway in question but did not make a
record of the signs in place and hence did not know what
signs had been installed (Tl34, R180). He did, however,
know that the design for the installation of the signs
"'vas really quite crude." (Tl41-143, Rl87-189)
Utah State Highway Patrolman Jack Graviet who
investigated the accident and traversed the portion of
the freeway in question said that the following signs
were in place at the time of the accident: (1) All Traffic
.Must Exit sign about one mile from scene of accident,
(2) Two 25 miles per hour speed limit signs about onequarter of a mile from scene of accident, (3) Barricades
with arrows near the end of the freeway with 25 miles
per hour sign, and, ( 4) Red and white Chevron signs at
the end of the freeway. He further stated that there were
no flashing lights at the end of the freeway ( Tl95, R241).
Clyde Beutler testified that he did not see any Chevron barricades (Deposition of Clyde Beutler, Page 24)
or anv Chevron signs prior to the exit (page 34) nor
did he recall any signs at the exit other than a speed
sign and a barricade and arrow sign (page 11) and an
exit speed 25 sign at the curve of the off ramp (page 7).
It is obvious from the preceeding cursory review of
the testimony of those who had any knowledge or who
were supposed to have some knowledge of what signs
11

were in place when the accident occurred that it is very
difficult to say exactly what signs 'vere up. The testimony is in conflict, and none of appellant's witnesses
had any knowledge of what signs \Vere in place at the
time of the accident.
Clyde Beutler's testimony of the in place signs was
different from that of Jack Graviet, the investigating
officer. Appellant complains in Point I of its brief that
the lower court did not accept in total the testimony of its
witnesses.
In a non-jury trial, the trial judge is empowered to
reconcile conflicts and discrepancies in the proof offered,
Armstrong vs. Grant (Tex. Civ. App.) 356 SW 2d 398.
\Vhere the evidence is in conflict, the trier of fact,
whether that be a judge or a jury, determines what should
be accE~pted as the truth and what should be rejected
as untrue or false, Cross vs. Ledford, 161 Ohio St. 469,
53 Ohio Ops. 361, 120 NE 2d 118; Rice vs. Cleveland, H4
Ohio St. 299, 29 Ohio Ops. 447, 58 NE 2d 768. It is a
general rule of law supported by the overwhelming
weight of authority that the trier of fact may disbelieve
all or any part of the testimony of a party or witness
if it is tainted with evasiveness, uncertainty, or contradictions, or that the finder of fact may believe only such
portion of the evidence that st>ems credible in the light
of other evidence, Bnrns vs. Radoicich, 77 Cal. App. 2d
697, 176 P 2d 77; Berger vs. Steiner, 72 Cal. App. 2d 208,
164 P. 2d 559. Utah cases supporting the propositions of
law statt'd above are Schlatter 'CS. McCarthy, 113 Utah
54:1, 196 P. 2d 968, reh den 113 Utah 560, 198 P. 2d 473,
12

where plaintiff's witnesses and defendant's witnesses
gave conflicting testimony, the jury was entitled to believe the testimony of plaintiff's witness. Aagard vs.
Dayton & illi.ller Red-E-lllix Concrete Co., 12 Utah 2d 34,
361 P. 2d 522, which states that although the trier of
fact cannot arbitrarily disregard competent, credible and
uncontradicted testimony, it may determine the weight
to be given testimony, and may refuse to find in accordance with it where there is any circumstance which
reasonable provides a basis for such refusal.
As has been stated, the testimony of almost all witnesses is conflicting as to exactly what road signs were
in place at the time and place of the accident. None of
the defendant's witnesses could say what signs were in
place, however, all of the State's witnesses did say that all
of the signs required by the State's own plan for signing
were not in place·. As it was the trial Court conceded to
the State of Utah most of the signs that it claims were
there.
Based upon the foregoing discussion, respondents
respectfully assert that Point I of appellant's brief is
without merit.
POINT III
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN FINDING ON THE EVIDENCE THAT THE SIGNS AS PLACED BY THE STATE
FAILED TO GIVE ADEQUATE, REASONABLE OR SUFFICIENT NOTICE.

In relation to the signs placed at or near the place
where the accident occnred, the trial court made the follmving finding:

13

G. That at the said time and place the signs
placed by the State failed to give adequate, reasonable or sufficient notice of a difficult and dangerous condition which existed or of the fact that
traffic would be required to turn onto a one lane
sharply curving exit road and accomplish a 270°
turn;
From reading the findings of fact, it is obvious
that the lmYer court did not find that the signs did not
give any warning or notice, but that they failed to gi\'e
adt>quatP warning of a dangerous condition which existed
at the end of the freeway. 'J.'he dangerous condition that
existed and for which the State did not give the motoring public adequate warning ·was, (a) a 35 mph reduction in speed from 70 to 25 mph, ( b) the reduction of
traffic lanes from three nvon "\Yhich a speed of 70 mph
was permitted to one upon which a speed of only 25 mph
was permitted, ( c) the one lane onto which the traffic
from three lanes was channelled "\Yas a narrow sltarpl~
curvi ng exit road, ( d) and that the sharply cuning one
lam-' road accomplished a 270° turn.
The lower court's finding that the State of Utah did
not give the motoring lmblic reasonable notice of a dang,'rnns condition that existt>d at thP t>nd of tht> freewa:·
is amply dt>monstrated hy thv evidence. It should be
nokll that the State did not erect all of the kinds or
amounts of signs as srweified by the construction signing plan adopted by it. 'rhe signs that should have been
in place according to the specifications of the State
Highway Department are as follo\rn: (a) Construction
approach warning :,;igns, three in number, (b) Exit sign
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with arrow, and ( c) 94 foot detom banicade with amber
flashing light. It appears from the evidence produced by
thc~ State of Utah that it did not even meet its own mini1mm1 requirements for adequate signing on the freeway
at the place of the accident.
Title 41-6-48, Utah Code Annotated provides as follows:
( e) The state road commission shall have exclusive authority to determine and declare prima
facie evidence of a lawful speed on state high
ways whether such highways be within or without
the corporate limits of any city. A state highway,
to be appropriately posted, must be posted with
reflector type signs whereon the prima facie lawful speed limit shall be designated. Wherever
there is a drop of 10 MPH or more in the posted
speed limit, it must be preceded by a sign giving
advance notice of such a reduction. Signs shall
be as specified in the current approved "Utah
Manual on Uniform Traffic Control Devices."
There was a reduction of speed of 35 mph where
the accident occmTt>d. As has bt>en said, the speed limit
was reduced from 70 mph on three lanes of traffic to
25 rnvlt for a sliarpl:· cnning narrmv one-lane exit road
which descrilwd a 270° arc. Tlw State, therefore, failed
to erect reduction in srwed signs as required by the
Statutes of the State. The signs which the State of Utah
erected certainl,\· gave notice but not of the dangerous
condition that existed. An interesting analogy to the condition that existed where the accident occurred is the
temporary end of the freeway at Page's Lane at or near
Centerville, Davis County. There the freeway comes to
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an end and the road signs so indicate. However, the road
into which the freeway leads continues on in a northerly
direction, and the traffic on the freeway is channelled
from 3 northbound lanes on the freeway to 2 northbound
lanes on the old road. At that point there is at most a
10 mph reduction in speed. A motorist who has recently
traversed the freeway near Centerville as Mr. Brooks
had would reasonably believe that the same conditiun
existed at Ogden unless he was specifically warned. Of
course, he was given no such notice or warning.
There are many cases dealing with the liability of a
State for the failure of its Highway Commission or Department to erect or maintain proper traffic control
signs or for the improper placing or maintenance of such.
No case covers the precise question presented on appeal
herein.

Brown, et al. vs. Highu·ay Commission of Kansas,
444 P. 2d 887 (Kan. 1968) was a case that involved an
automobile accident which resulted in the death of a
mother and her six year old son and brain damage to her
eight year old daughter ·who were passengers in a vehicle
traveling on a state highway at an intersection ·with a
c-onntr>· road. Plaintiff's vehicle \ms struck by tortfoasor motorist who failed to obsene and stop at a stop
:-;ign on tlw subservient road which stop sign was obscnrred from sight b>· bushes and trees. Plaintiffs claimed that the fact that the stop sign was obscured was a
defect in the highway and the Highway Commission
denied on the ground that since the stop sign was not on
the travelled portion of the roadway it was not such a
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defect. The court stated that even though the stop sign
was not on the travelled portion of the roadway that
fact did not preclude it from being a defect in the highway. The court further went on to say that the adoption
of a Uniform Traffic Control Manual by the State Highway Commission imposes an absolute duty on the Highway Commission to conform to the rules set out in the
Manual, and hence an absolute duty to maintain traffic
control devices at the intersection with a through highway. It is sufficient merely that the defective condition
affect the safety of the highway. Although the State
Highway Commission has discretion to designate a road
as a State Highway, once it does so it has an absolute
duty to comply with the requirements of the Manual on
Uniform Traffic Control Devices and to install and maintain traffic control devices sufficient and efficient to
control traffic entering thereon.

In that case the Kansas Supreme Court affirmed a
judgment of $102,029 for plaintiffs stating that a fivP
foot high stop sign which was obstructed by bushes and
shrnbs was not effectively warning motorists, that the
sign should have been at least seven feet high and hence
it was a defect in the highway.
Other cases taking substantially this same view are
Fanning vs. City of Larmnie, 402 P. 2d 460 (Wyo. 1965),
improperly maintained stop sign; Luddy vs. State, ....
N.Y.S. 2d .... (N.Y. Ct. Claims, No. 42938, 1968), failure
to warn motorist of a deceptively re-routed highway;
WelJer vs. State, (Cal. Trial Ct., Feb, 1968) 11 ATL New
L. 156-157, failure to post sign warning of a treacherous
17

on a G5 mph road; State t·s. Watson, 436 P. 2d 175
(Ariz. 19G7); State's liability for failure to warn motorist of a narrow bridge; ran Airsdalt? vs. H oUingr:'r, GG
Cal. Rptr. 20, 437 P. 2d 508 (Cal, 1968) City's liability
for negligence of indepPndent contractor, under nondelegable duty exception, for contractor's negligence in
handling job of eradicating white line markings on a
bnsy street while keeping one of three lanes of traffic
opPn to traffic; Pfeifer vs. City of Jan Joaquin, 55 Cal.
Rptr. 103 (Cal. App. 19GG) County eliminated pedestrian
crosswalk but failed to obliterate "Ped Xing" warning
on highway. See also Stone vs. Arizona Highway Commission, 381 P. 2d 107 (Ariz. 1963), Jcmita Rice, Spec. Adm:r.
1·s. Clark County r:'t al., 328 P. 2d 605 (Nev. 1963).
CHlT('

It seems abundantly clear from the facts of the instant casP that the State of Utah failed to give reasonable and adequate notice or warning to motorists of tlw
dang0rous condition of the highway at the temporary Pncl
of the freeway. Not all of the necessary signs were installed and the signs that were in place were not correlatPd as to the warning or notice that should have been
gfren. In fact, the signs that were installed not only
failed to give adequate warning of the dangerous conditions, they were deceptive in what they stated. After
haYing seen all of the signs, the State had installed or
wanted to install, there was still not adequate notice, or
an~· notice at all for that matter, of a greatly reduced
s1wed limit, an extreme narrffwing of the roadway, a
11arrow, sharp, hazardous, curving exit road, and a sudden change of direction on the narrow, sharp, dangerous
and hazardous exit road of 270°.
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Respondent contends that on the basis of the facts
of this case and the law as st·t forth that the lower
court's finding in this regard was reasonable and accurate.
POINT IV
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN FINDING THAT THE
DRIVER, BROOKS, OPERATED THE UNIT IN A REASONABLE AND PRUDENT MANNER.

Respondent incorporates into Point IV of this brief
the facts, law and argument set forth under Point III.
The lower court found ''that Brooks was driving
the said unit in a reasonable and prudent manner, was
unable to negotiate the exit from the freeway as a result
of which the unit left the roadway and overturned"
(R32, 33).
In this regard it should be born in mind that it vms
dark, the roadway was wet or moist, it was foggy in
places along the roadway, the State of Utah had not
erected all of the necessary signs under its own construction signing plan, and the signs that were installed
did not give warning of the dangerous condition that
existed at the temporary end of the freeway. Couple
this with the fact that Mr. Brooks has been an interstate
trucker for about 25 years, drin's approximately 50,000
miles per year and has never before had an accident, he
was not tired having had a rest stop in Price, Utah, and
the fact that he was driYing a large rig with a load of
about 40,000 pmmds at a speed of approximately 30 to

35 mph. It is obvious why the trial court found Mr.
Brooks free from negligence.
It is also of interest to note that the investigating
police officer had been called to investigate other accident:;; at the place in question and it was his opinion that
the accident was the result of inadequate markings and
the sharp curve or inadequate engineering and markings
and the sharp curve (T92, R138). Mr. Brooks also told
the investigating officer that the highway was not properly marked ( T72, R118). ·when all of this is considered
with the testimony of Clyde Beutler, that the traffic control signs were inadequate, he had difficulty negotiating
tht• curve immediately after the accident, and while he
was at the scene, several other vehicles had difficulty
negotiating the cnrve of the exit road, thunders that thP
cause of this accident was not caused by any negligence
on the part of Mr. Brooks but because of the negligence
of the State of Utah.
Respondent frankly admits that the evidence received immediately above is not conclusive but does
suggest that it is extremely persuasive and is sufficient
basis for the lower court's finding.
The question of negligence is a matter for the determination of the finder of fact, and unless reasonable
mind:;; could not differ, the finding of the lower court
must he sustained. Respondent respectfully submits that
reasonable minds could differ on whether Mr. Brooks
was negligent at the time and place of the accident. If
this is trne, then the finding of the lower court must remain undisturbed on appeal.
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The propositions of law stated herein are basic
being what is commonly referred to as hornbrook law,
therefore, respondent has not cited any authorities for
the rules of law stated.
POINT V
THE NEGLIGENCE OF THE DRIVER, BROOKS WOULD
BAR ANY RECOVERY BY THE DRIVER OR HIS EMPLOYER, OWNER OF THE DAMAGED UNIT FROM THE
STATE OF UTAH.

While agreeing with the general rule of law stated
in Point IV of appellant's brief, respondent denies any
negligence on the part of the driver, Brooks.
There is no question that Paul Bramel owned the
rig William Brooks was driving at the time and place of
the accident. It is also a fact that Brooks was an employee
of Bramel in the scope of his employment at the time. It
is conceded that if Brooks was negligent at the time of
and place of the accident his negligence would be a bar
to any recovery by either himsrlf or Mr. Bramel against
the State of Utah. The trial court, however, found Mr.
Brooks free from negligence and respondents believe
that to be a reasonable finding under all the facts and
circumstances of this casf'.
For the sake of brevity, respondent incorporates the
contents of Point IV of this brief into Point V hereof.
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CONCLUSION
Plaintiffs-Respondents respectfully assert that the
position taken by Defendant-Appellant in this case and
as presented in Points I-IV of its brief is not well taken.
Considering the record on appeal, with the exhibits as
part thereof, and the argument contained in its brief,
appellant is not entitled to the relief it seeks in this matter since no error was committed by the trial court in
its disposition of this case.
Based on the foregoing facts, authorities, and argument, it appears clear that this court should affirm the
jndt,:r:inent of the District Court wherein judgment was
granted in favor of plaintiffs and against defendant.
Respectfully submitted,
KIPP AND CHRISTIAN
Carman E. Kipp, and
D. Gary Christian
Attorneys for Plaintiff and
Respondent
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